



The Rise of Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria in Hospitals: Investigating Sources, Spread, and Strategies for Control

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Received: 2025 19, Jul

Accepted: 2025 28, Aug

Published: 2025 17, Sep

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Annotation: Multidrug resistant (MDR) bacteria are an ever-growing concern worldwide, particularly for hospitalised patients. These organisms remain a persistent source of healthcare associated infections (HAIs) and have become a critical threat, with only limited treatment options currently available. As a result, the risk to patient safety and well-being has been intensified, with increased hospital stays and mortality rates. It is essential, therefore, to understand the origins of MDR bacteria in hospital settings, the mechanisms and routes through which they spread, and the methods by which the dissemination of these organisms can be effectively controlled. Several factors contribute to the increased risk of MDR bacterial infection in hospitals: Indwelling medical devices act as key pathways for infection; the use, and frequently overuse, of antimicrobial agents creates selective pressure which enables bacteria to develop resistance; and the spread of MDR bacteria is, of course, facilitated by cross-transmission within the healthcare environment.

Bacteria are capable of several different mechanisms of resistance, spanning efflux pumps and

decreased permeability through enzymatic inactivation and alteration of the target structure. Such mechanisms may be employed individually or in combination to build the phenomenon of multi-drug resistance. MDR can be understood as resistance to three or more classes of antimicrobial agents. These mechanisms arise naturally within the population but are encouraged through selective pressure, such as lack of adherence to antibiotic treatment and the overuse of antimicrobials, which can lead to the development of MDR bacteria and their rapid proliferation in both hospitals and the community.

1. Introduction

Multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria represent a major danger in healthcare today [1]. It is important to understand how MDR spreads as a critical step toward stopping the extended outbreaks that we sometimes see. MDR drives up the cost of patients' stays and limits treatment options. The clinical and economic impact is well-documented and frequently cited; one of the motivating issues for this paper was an acute recognition of the plethora of ways in which the problem can be addressed. Fouling patients severely, carbapenems for example—considered antibiotics of last resort—continue to have steadily diminishing efficacy against resistant bacteria. Gram-negative pathogens, have received particular attention in recent years. They cause a large majority of healthcare-acquired infections; in intensive care units they contribute to morbidity and mortality; and few obligated gram-negative pathogens fall outside the broad authority of the term. Among the bacteria most associated with infection of hospitalized patients are *Acinetobacter baumannii*, *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, *enterobacter*, *Proteus mirabilis*, and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*. Infection agents of this type, actually comprising a miscellany of bacteria ranging across various phylogenetic origins, are sometimes referred to (unfortunately) as nosocomial pathogens.

Hospitals and healthcare facilities present numerous opportunities for the transmission and spread of MDR. Understanding how the anatomy and organization of hospitalized patients contribute to the acquisition of these organisms still does not receive the attention it should, especially considering the human-driven evolution of resistance to levels that are 2–3 orders of magnitude higher than those in general environmental populations. The issue was present when penicillin came into widespread use, and although it often appeared that the race toward effective chemotherapy had been won, the increasing use of prophylactic and therapeutic antibiotics simply continued to drive the proliferation of resistance genes. As the use of broad-spectrum antibiotics and combination therapy to combat these mechanisms increased, the emergence of new resistant clones and species diminished the effect of those control efforts. A major concern for clinicians reviewing samples lies in the heterogeneity of the high-level resistant population and in the sheer numbers of resistance elements in the environment—thus the large number of resistance elements involved in bacterial MDR provides a multiplex that allows us to remain optimistic and confident that new resistant populations will continue to emerge. [2][3][4][5]

2. Understanding Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria

Bacteria resistant to three or more classes of antimicrobial drugs are termed multidrug resistant (MDR), a characteristic commonly found in microorganisms isolated from critically ill patients. These MDR bacteria exist in various forms—multidrug-resistant (resistant to three or more classes of antibiotics, not necessarily all), extensively drug-resistant (XDR; susceptible to only

one or two antimicrobial classes), or pan drug-resistant (PDR; resistant to all routinely used antibiotics) [6]. Such resistance mechanisms facilitate the survival of bacteria in hospital environments, necessitating consideration when investigating potential sources.

Major subgroups of MDR bacteria include extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-PE), *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, *Acinetobacter baumannii*, *Clostridioides difficile*, vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE), and methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA). The ES(C)KAPE group—comprising species responsible for the majority of nosocomial infections—includes *Enterococcus faecium*, *Staphylococcus aureus*, *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, *Acinetobacter baumannii*, *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, and *Enterobacter* species. These MDR bacteria frequently emerge in severely ill patients and carriers, and—although generally less competitive without selective antimicrobial pressure—can persist in patients previously exposed to antimicrobials [7].

2.1. Definition and Classification

Multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria are defined as bacteria resistant to three or more classes of antimicrobial agents of different structure and cellular targets. Pan drug-resistant bacteria are resistant to all agents listed. Various mechanisms, including enzymatic degradation, target modification, and active efflux, shape MDR persistence. Most MDR bacteria belong to the genera *Acinetobacter*, *Enterobacter*, *Klebsiella*, *Pseudomonas*, and *Staphylococcus* [8].

2.2. Mechanisms of Resistance

Mechanisms of resistance encompass the acquisition of resistant clones—such as methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* and pandrug-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii*—and the horizontal transfer and recombination of resistance genes that affect key antibiotic classes including macrolides, lincosamides, and vancomycin. The emergence of multidrug resistance in nonfermenting gram-negative bacteria has necessitated the reintroduction of agents like colistin. Dissemination is facilitated by interhospital transfer and community spread. Understanding these bacterial resistance strategies is essential to inform treatment development and curtail the propagation of resistance [9].

3. Sources of Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria in Hospitals

Several sources of multidrug-resistant bacteria (MDR) have been identified in hospitals. A highly contaminated hospital environment is a significant source of bacteria responsible for healthcare-associated infections (HAI). Surfaces contaminated by multidrug-resistant microorganisms aid the persistence of such pathogens in the hospital when cleaning and disinfection are insufficient. The frequent detection of MDR bacteria on medical equipment, furniture, and filtration systems corroborates the environment's role as a reservoir [8]. Another important source of MDR is the colonized or infected patients themselves. Transmission can occur from patient to patient usually via hands and/or the clothes of healthcare workers. Patients can remain colonized for months or even years. Healthcare workers play a key role in the dissemination of MDR bacteria in hospital wards. In many cases, failure to comply with standard precautions (e.g. hand hygiene and use of gloves) may be responsible for the spread of resistant pathogens between patients.

3.1. Environmental Reservoirs

Antimicrobial resistance is a major microbial threat of the 21st century. Strains resistant to one or more drugs active at the Level of a species, called MDR bacteria, are considered as an increasing threat that has rapidly spread out of hospitals. A fraction of MDR bacteria is detected in hospital effluents. Upon release in the outside environment, MDR bacteria become a major concern because they transfer their resistance determinants to a large and taxonomically diversified microbial community [10]. In addition to effluents, hospital environments likely represent great niches for the accumulation of MDR bacteria [11].

3.2. Patient-to-Patient Transmission

Transmission from patient to patient can occur by direct contact or indirectly through the hands of healthcare personnel. Although patient-to-patient transmission illustrates the difficulty of eradicating endemic MDR pathogens from hospitals, it is not the only route by which MDR bacteria persist. Most extensive studies of the epidemiology of MDR pathogens, including recent measurements during hospital outbreaks, show that additional reservoirs may contribute to the persistence of the bacteria in the hospital. Patient-to-patient transmission can be prevented through screening, isolation, and the use of effective barrier precautions. Widespread dissemination of MDR pathogens among patients, however, can make this approach prohibitively expensive, so control measures must incorporate an understanding of the role of additional sources for a particular pathogen. Treating patients who are identified as colonized with MDR bacteria to eliminate the pathogen or reduce the level of carriage provides another potential method to reduce the spread of MDR bacteria. Although such decolonization has been effective for some bacteria (notably MRSA), it is rarely effective for most MDR Gram-negative pathogens and should not be viewed as a substitute for more traditional control measures [12].

3.3. Healthcare Workers as Vectors

Antimicrobial-resistant bacteria can colonise the skin, mucosa and clothing of healthcare workers (HCW) and be spread to patients during healthcare procedures [13]. HCW can also act as vectors of antimicrobial-resistant bacteria on medical equipment. Several studies have reported carriage of multidrug-resistant pathogens by HCW, highlighting their potential as vectors for the transmission of potentially pathogenic microorganisms. Carriage of *Staphylococcus aureus*, coagulase-negative staphylococci and Enterococci resistant to methicillin, aminoglycosides and other antimicrobials has been widely documented in different hospitals. HCW in hospitals in countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, India and Nigeria also show significant carriage of methicillin-resistant *S. aureus* (MRSA) and methicillin-resistant coagulase-negative staphylococci on their hands and nasal mucosa. In general, *S. aureus* nasal carriage among HCW varies between 14% and 45% according to the scientific literature and 2–15% of HCW may be persistent MRSA carriers. The risk of nosocomial *S. aureus* infection increases when HCW carry one or more strain(s) of MRSA on their hands and nasal mucosa. Other carriage sites such as hands, wrists and forearms may be colonised transiently when they come into contact with contaminated environmental surfaces, patient skin and other colonised persons. The hospital environment – including surfaces that are frequently touched by HCW, sinks, pillows, bed linen, suction tubes and door handles – is frequently contaminated with nosocomial agents of infection. An important mechanism for transmission of healthcare-associated infection is the contamination of HCW and medical equipment during invasive healthcare procedures, e.g., endotracheal intubation and suctioning, administration of intravenous fluids, infections with haemodialysis equipment, and excretory care to incontinent patients. Contamination of extra cellular sites such as infusion pumps or ultrasound probes can also be the source of healthcare-associated infections and antimicrobial-resistant outbreaks.

4. Spread of Multidrug-Resistant Bacteria

The proliferation of multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria in hospitals engenders a formidable challenge to treatment [14]. Infection pathways transmit resistance through diverse patient-care environments. Healthcare workers facilitate widespread dissemination [1]. Once established in hospitals, containment becomes difficult. Medical devices maintain widespread transmission. Antimicrobial therapy promotes the spread of MDR. Underlying transmission mechanisms surfaces anew.

4.1. Infection Pathways

Multidrug-resistant bacteria can be spread through a variety of infection pathways, depending on the pathogen and the clinical situation [15]. These include direct contact with an infected or

colonized patient, contact with contaminated environmental surfaces or healthcare workers' hands, or contact with contaminated medical equipment such as ventilators or catheters. Contaminated medical devices have played a major role in the spread of hospital-acquired infections such as those caused by methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* [12]. Invasive medical procedures or devices, such as endotracheal intubation, central venous catheters, or urinary catheters, can also provide direct entry points for bacteria, further facilitating the spread of multidrug-resistant bacteria. Several infection pathways can coexist or occur sequentially, creating complex chains of transmission: a single contaminated surface may in turn contaminate several healthcare workers who subsequently transmit bacteria to numerous patients. The use of antimicrobial agents can also influence infection pathways by selectively eliminating the susceptible bacteria in a patient's microbiota and allowing the resistant bacteria to expand and become dominant, leading to overgrowth of multidrug-resistant origination.

4.2. Role of Medical Devices

Medical devices associated with invasive procedures are often implicated in the transmission of multidrug-resistant bacteria (MDR). Devices such as catheters, ventilators, and central lines breach natural defense barriers and provide surfaces to which microbial biofilms can adhere. These reservoirs facilitate infection not only within patients relative to immunological status, but also between individuals through device reuse without adequate sterilization [16].

A wide range of MDR bacteria have been isolated from medical device-associated infections in hospital settings. Some of the most common gram-positive pathogens include coagulase-negative *Staphylococci* and the vancomycin-resistant *Staphylococcus capitis*. Gram-negative bacteria are often dominated by carbapenem-resistant *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, *Stenotrophomonas maltophilia*, and *Acinetobacter baumannii*. *Candida parapsilosis* is consistently among the most prevalent fungal pathogens associated with device-related bloodstream and urinary tract infections.

4.3. Impact of Antimicrobial Use

Antimicrobial use in human and veterinary medicine has exerted a selective pressure on bacteria, encouraging the development of resistance traits that constitute an increasing global problem [17]. Development of resistance can occur through natural or acquired resistance mechanisms, but widespread inappropriate antimicrobial use is the main driver of escalating resistance. Antimicrobial resistance severely undermines effective infection control, leading to extended hospitalisation periods, increased economic burden, and excess mortality.

In the United Kingdom, there is an estimated upwards of 5,000 additional deaths per year directly related to antimicrobial resistance, with the situation expected to worsen if effective control measures are not established [18]. Antimicrobial use in hospital settings prolongs hospitalisation and increases mortality and economic costs by selecting and facilitating the spread of resistant bacteria. Although surgeons and healthcare providers continue to prescribe antibiotics indiscriminately, actions such as prescribing microbiologically active agents, reducing duration of use, and avoiding unnecessarily broad-spectrum agents or co-administration of multiple antimicrobials can help reduce the development of multi-drug resistance. Reducing consumption of long treatment courses and antimicrobial types leads to a fall in the prevalence of resistant bacteria.

5. Epidemiology of Multidrug-Resistant Infections

The epidemiology of multidrug-resistant infections (MDR) reveals the prevalence and severity of these infections, as well as their impact on patient outcomes [8]. Residence in long-term care units or elderly care facilities is a significant predictor of colonization and infection with MDR bacteria, underscoring the need for targeted infection control measures in these settings. An influx of multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacteria, predominantly among elderly inpatients

with bloodstream infections, poses a substantial challenge to hospital infection control efforts. Studies also identify higher risks of MDR infections in patients with solid tumors, pointing to the necessity of enhanced surveillance and antimicrobial stewardship in oncology units. Outbreaks of MDR *Acinetobacter baumannii* in intensive care units necessitate the implementation of both antimicrobial and organizational strategies to effectively contain the spread. Concurrently, hospital-acquired infections with MDR bacteria adversely affect outcomes in oncology-intensive-care patients, emphasizing the clinical importance of timely diagnosis and treatment. Community-associated methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (CA-MRSA) further compounds the problem due to its notable virulence, transmissibility, and resistance to multiple antibiotics.

The widespread occurrence of MDR infections is linked to complex transmission dynamics that are challenging to control [1]. The basic reproductive number, R_0 , serves as a key metric in assessing the potential for outbreak propagation, with all related parameters influencing infection spread. Mathematical models incorporate factors such as transmission rates and pathogen characteristics to simulate the dissemination of MDR organisms within healthcare settings, including intensive care units. Infection management strategies and isolation precautions are identified as critical control measures to limit pathogen transmission. Additional research highlights challenges such as false-negative detection methods and the biofilm-promoting effects of inadequate antibiotic therapy, which facilitate colonization by resistant organisms. These insights support the development of comprehensive interventions to prevent and control MDR infections in hospital environments.

5.1. Prevalence Rates in Different Settings

The distribution of multidrug-resistant (MDR) infections varies according to clinical setting, patient age, disease status, underlying comorbidities, immune function, exposure to invasive procedures and surgery, length of hospital stay, and antimicrobial therapy [8]. The overall MDR prevalence rate among 3,223 infected patients from a tertiary general hospital was 65.3%. The proportion of MDR pathogens isolated from secondary specimens exceeded 67%, and the prevalence of MDR infection was relatively higher in intensive care units. Moreover, the prevalence of MDR isolates increased with patient age. Among the various sites of infection, MDR strains most frequently led to pulmonary infections and also commonly caused bloodstream infection, urinary tract infection, and surgical site infection.

5.2. Demographic Factors

Demographic factors influence the risk of hospital-acquired infection (HAI) with multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria. Patients aged older than 60 years carry a higher risk of bloodstream infection involving MDR, gram-negative bacteria, while pairs of patients admitted simultaneously have a higher risk of a shared MDR Gram-negative bloodstream isolate [8]. Likewise, heavy use of invasive devices is a recognised risk factor for infection with MDR bacterial pathogens. Multidrug resistance plays a key role in infections involving the respiratory tract, with hospital-acquired pneumonia and ventilator-associated pneumonia caused by resistant *A. baumannii*, *P. aeruginosa*, *K. pneumoniae* and *S. aureus*. MDR infections are common in intensive care units: knowledge of the risk factors associated with MDR infections and the combined use of antimicrobial and infection surveillance systems remain critical to managing development and spread of MDR bacteria. In tertiary hospital settings a high burden of MDR organisms affects patients with recent stays in long-term care facilities. Circulating MDR bacteria have a marked impact on infections, particularly in oncology intensive care units, where prolonged stays lead to heavy exposure and colonisation; the relative risk of needing carbapenem or colistin treatment increases with the number of carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative colonised body sites and highlights the potential for widespread dissemination if clinical measures to limit spread are not implemented and enforced. Facilities dedicated to the care of elderly patients show persistent colonisation with resistant bacteria, with continuous transmission between

patients and the care environment, emphasising the risk of further dissemination and challenging long-term infection control and prevention measures. Community events have also contributed to the emergence of MDR strains: the prevalence of community-associated methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) now exceeds that in healthcare settings in some regions, bringing new challenges to education and empirical antibiotic guidance, particularly for vulnerable populations such as the elderly or those with underlying conditions.

5.3. Impact on Patient Outcomes

Hospital-acquired infections and colonization with multidrug-resistant bacteria significantly impact patient outcomes [8]. Elderly individuals and patients with hematological diseases are especially vulnerable. Multidrug-resistant organisms frequently occur in intensive care and long-term care settings, increasing morbidity and mortality rates. The presence of resistant bacteria complicates treatment and may extend hospital stays. Outbreaks of resistant bacteria such as *Acinetobacter baumannii* necessitate tailored antimicrobial and organizational responses. Overall, hospital infections with resistant bacteria are associated with adverse clinical outcomes, underscoring the need for robust infection control measures to protect patient prognosis.

6. Strategies for Control and Prevention

The prevention and control of multidrug-resistant bacteria (MDR) require several coordinated approaches to limit transmission within the hospital. Effective infection control guidelines are fundamental and include isolation and cleaning protocols, screening patients and visitors for outbreaks, monitoring surfaces and hospital waste, adequately donning and doffing protective equipment, and reporting incidents to a dedicated committee [19]. Specific guidelines for transfer and discharge further reduce spread to other institutions and the community [14]. Antimicrobial stewardship programmes (ASP) focus on comprehensive infection control and on appropriate, targeted antibiotic use. These collaborative interventions—such as selective decolonisation, antioxidant prophylaxis, and rapid on-site screening—successfully limit spread, reduce colonisation, and significantly decrease MDR infection and mortality. Surveillance systems coordinate many of these control applications, and are essential to patient management, pre-emptive identification, and epidemiological studies. Effective education and training should be provided to healthcare professionals, and to patients and their families, so that standard precautions are maintained and control protocols effectively implemented.

6.1. Infection Control Practices

Infection control practices constitute a multifaceted strategy encompassing contact precautions, antibiotic stewardship programs, screening protocols, surveillance systems, and active patient decolonization. Universal standard precautions, such as hand hygiene and instrument decontamination, form the foundational elements for limiting pathogen transmission at the point of care. Compliance is bolstered by educational and programmatic interventions targeting healthcare workers. Implementation of contact isolation and quarantine measures, sometimes in specialty units, remains contentious, with evidence for efficacy varying across settings and bacterial species. Screening and surveillance programs utilizing culture-dependent and molecular diagnostics facilitate early identification of carriers, guiding pre-emptive intervention deployment. Antimicrobial stewardship underpins efforts to curtail resistance emergence by enforcing careful selection and sensible use of antibiotics. Active decolonization employs topical agents against pathogens like *Staphylococcus aureus* to reduce colonization burdens.

At the dawn of the antimicrobial era, multidrug-resistant bacteria (MDR) surfaced just as a suite of novel treatment alternatives expanded the therapeutic arsenal. After an initial phase of containment lasting roughly two decades, MDR organisms are now on the rise globally, a development likely to shape clinical and policy landscapes for years to come. MDR bacteria have become a recognized threat not only in the healthcare environment, where infections weaken already compromised patients, but also in the community and among travelers, where

they establish reservoirs facilitating population-level spread. The problem of resistance is pervasive, yet it is particularly worrisome in healthcare institutions. Hospitals provide surfaces, treatments, and hosts conducive to both selection of MDR phenotypes and their transmission within vulnerable populations. The emergence and accumulation of antimicrobials and disinfectant agents in the hospital environment during the twentieth century further accelerated this process [20].

6.2. Antibiotic Stewardship Programs

Antibiotic stewardship programs ensure the appropriate use of antibiotics by promoting optimal drug selection, dosing, duration, and administration [21]. According to the CDC, stewardship efforts measure and improve prescribing practices to guarantee that antibiotics are prescribed only when needed and that the right drug, dose, and duration are selected. Core objectives include strong leadership commitment to evidence-based guidelines, education of staff and providers, monitoring of antimicrobial resistance trends, and the engagement of a multidisciplinary team to inform patients and families. The Joint Commission has established antimicrobial stewardship standards for healthcare facilities emphasizing leadership commitment, accountability, drug expertise, action, tracking, reporting, and education. Currently, no financial incentives exist for implementing stewardship programs in outpatient clinics.

Intensive care units exhibit the highest density of antimicrobial use and bacterial resistance [22]. Guidelines from the Infectious Diseases Society of America and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America recommend antibiotic stewardship strategies centered on prospective audits with intervention and feedback, as well as formulary restriction with preauthorization. Additional approaches may include education, clinical pathways, antimicrobial cycling, and de-escalation of therapy. A multimodal institution-wide antimicrobial stewardship program at a university hospital targeted adult ICUs to improve *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* susceptibility and antibiotic use.

6.3. Surveillance Systems

Hospital infection-control teams regularly monitor key types of MRD to track changes in levels of resistance [23]. Surveillance of bacterial resistance plays an important role in controlling drug resistance. The number of strains isolated in 2022 increased compared with that in 2021. The top five bacteria, namely, *Escherichia coli*, *Klebsiella pneumoniae*, *Staphylococcus aureus*, *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, and *Acinetobacter baumannii*, remained largely unchanged. The detection rate of methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) decreased continuously. The detection rates of carbapenem-resistant *Klebsiella pneumoniae* (CRKP) and carbapenem-resistant *Escherichia coli* (CREC) continued to rise in 2022, whereas the detection rates of meropenem-resistant *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* and meropenem-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii* showed a declining trend for the fourth consecutive year [24]. Antimicrobial resistance surveillance plays a crucial role in protecting antibiotics and can be used to identify the early emergence and dissemination of resistance. Current systems do not collect nor report AST data for recently marketed antibiotics and have not been designed to do so. Early resistance surveillance has therefore to start immediately when a new antibiotic becomes available and must continue until sporadic outbreaks occur before the transition to routine surveillance. National authorities should set up surveillance systems with coordination and technical support from a supranational body to ensure representativeness and high data quality. In addition, funding and capacity building are important to increase the ability of existing surveillance systems to collect and share resistance data, expand surveillance networks to cover a broader geographic area and a wider range of patient populations, ensure the collection of patient-level data, and provide the resources needed to improve and accelerate the response to emerging resistance. Strengthening efforts to identify resistance in difficult-to-treat infections is crucial to contain untreatable infections. An appropriate public health response requires a purpose-built AMR surveillance strategy for recently marketed antibiotics.

7. Role of Education and Training

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is an escalating global health threat [25]. Insufficient knowledge of antimicrobial agents, resistance mechanisms, and transmission pathways promotes inappropriate prescription and antimicrobial misuse/overuse, undermining efforts toward prudent AMR use. A multidisciplinary core group, including infectious disease specialists, microbiologists, pharmacists, and antibiotic stewardship teams, should develop and implement local educational programs on prudent antimicrobial prescribing [20]. Establishing national training programmes for antibiotic stewardship trainers constitutes an effective policy approach. The European “ABS International”, launched in 2006, operates as a national training programme for stewardship trainers across nine Member States. ESGAP curates accessible web-based resources to support hospital-based stewardship initiatives and to inform healthcare professionals. Biannual postgraduate training courses conducted by ESGAP have instructed over 400 professionals to date. Education on prudent antimicrobial consumption should be extended to schoolteachers and nurses with mechanisms to ensure their preparedness. National policies must mandate dedicated training opportunities for these groups. Public Health England’s “train the trainer” materials for school nurses and other educational practitioners address hygiene, infection transmission, and prudent antimicrobial use.

7.1. Training Healthcare Professionals

The multidrug resistance of bacteria constitutes a significant and important problem in hospitals. As the number of the infected patients increases, various multidrug resistant strains emerge and spread throughout the hospital, producing a challenging health condition for health-care professionals and a heavy economic burden, mainly because good solutions are not yet broadly available. Data have been presented in two recent reviews, citing 100–200 thousand deaths directly attributed to antibiotic resistance annually in Europe and the US, along with a five-billion-Euro excess cost due to treatment and productivity loss; the numbers are even higher if neglected treatment, estimated at one hundred thousand deaths in 2010 in India and China also, is included. The naturally developing multidrug resistance mostly accompanies the acquisition of competitive and invasive phenotypic strategies exhibited by the bacterial pathogens, which consist of transient hypermutability, DNA-transfer abilities, quorum sensing, detoxification, host evasion, and intracellular survival. The resulting interventional difficulties substantially arise from physician behavior and mis-prescription due to perceived patient satisfaction, in-hospital, and environmental spread, with several emergent resistant strains such as *Pseudomonas*, *Klebsiella*, *Acinetobacter*, and recently community acquired methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* already reaching endemic proportions in hospitals. The burden of multidrug resistance in hospitals can be diminished by a strategic and topologically methodological hospital-wise deployment of the fundamentals from medical microbiology and epidemiology within the sensitive framework of a probabilistic graph that can still provide the topological robustness and adaptability of natural microstructures observed in the cell, where a discrete combinatorial transformation is shown to have dramatic effects, and a few simultaneous interventions on specific nodes can collapse the structure [26].

7.2. Patient Education Initiatives

Informing patients about the risk factors for hospital-acquired infections is instrumental in containing their spread. Some hospitals have addressed this threat by training health professionals to communicate the risks effectively. This allows patients to take additional precautionary measures and potentially adjust their behaviors to mitigate risk. Patient education may constitute an effective complementary approach for controlling the spread of MDR bacteria [14].

8. Research and Innovation in Combatting Resistance

The growing threat of multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria has spurred a surge in research

activity. Understanding antibacterial targets and resistance mechanisms provides a foundation for designing new strategies. Extensive screening for novel chemical entities alongside efforts focused directly on circumventing resistance have yielded promising leads. Approaches concentrate on both classical and emerging targets, often supplemented with adjuvant compounds that restore the potency of existing antibiotics. Although the field suffers from high development costs and a meager financial return, pharmaceutical companies remain indispensable for advancing candidates through clinical phases. Collaborations between industry and academia facilitate the pooling of resources and expertise. Public-private partnerships help bridge the gap between fundamental discoveries and therapeutic application, offering a viable framework to tackle antibiotic resistance.

8.1. Novel Antimicrobial Agents

The emergence of antibiotic resistance and multidrug resistance among common bacterial pathogens is a global health concern. The rapid dissemination of resistance genes complicates the treatment of infections, further limiting the options available [27]. Consequently, the quest for novel antimicrobial compounds is imperative to combat infections caused by these pathogens. These novel small-molecule antimicrobial agents can be classified as either synthetic or natural products. The development and optimization of fragment libraries, enhancement of natural product supplies, improvements in high-throughput screening, and the advancement of antibiotic combination therapies are pivotal strategies. Multidrug-resistant *Acinetobacter* species pose a major challenge in hospital environments [9]. The rise of extended-spectrum and metallo-beta-lactamases compounds the difficulty in managing resistant Gram-negative pathogens. Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) strains have evolved reduced susceptibility to vancomycin, and drug-resistant *Streptococcus pneumoniae* prevalence continues to increase. Efflux pump mechanisms contribute notably to nosocomial resistance, while macrolide-resistant Group A *Streptococcus* has been reported in the United States. Community-acquired MRSA infections remain a persistent concern, and emerging beta-lactamases further complicate therapeutic strategies. Antimicrobial agents such as linezolid demonstrate activity against resistant Gram-positive organisms, underscoring the importance of integrated chemo-therapeutic approaches. Ongoing surveillance of resistance patterns in both community and healthcare settings is essential to inform treatment and guide the development of new antimicrobial agents.

8.2. Phage Therapy

Phage therapy has resurfaced as a promising approach to combat multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacterial pathogens. The emergence of MDR bacteria threatens the utility of conventional antibiotics and has revitalised the search for alternative antimicrobial strategies. Bacteriophages, viruses that specifically infect and lyse bacteria, were used to treat infectious diseases during the early 20th century prior to the antibiotic era. Phage therapy relies on virulent (lytic) phages that replicate obligately in the host bacterium, undergoing a lytic cycle that culminates in host-cell rupture. The rise in antimicrobial resistance motivates renewed interest in phage therapy. The host specificity of most phages and the potential for evolving bacterial resistance to phage infection represent important challenges. Bacteria employ diverse interference strategies to prevent phage adsorption, block DNA injection and abort infection, whereas phages have evolved countermeasures such as receptor modification, restriction site masking and escape from CRISPR-Cas systems. The rapid development of resistance against antibiotics has heightened the appeal of phage therapies and prompted reviews of recent progress towards their development [28]. The rise of multidrug-resistant bacteria has generated a global health crisis that threatens to invalidate many of the antibiotics currently in use and cause an overwhelming increase in human death rates. Predictions project 10 million deaths annually by 2050 due to antimicrobial resistance, underlining the urgency of alternative solutions such as bacteriophages. Félix d'Herelle's early twentieth-century discovery of bacteriophages led to widespread therapeutic applications prior to the antibiotic era, with recent interest reignited by the increasing prevalence of resistant bacterial infections [29].

8.3. Vaccination Strategies

Preventive measures encompass both bacteria- and host-targeted substances. Vaccines and monoclonal antibodies interrupt bacterial multiplication or target specific virulence factors [1]. A vaccination against staphylococcal infections, currently being tested, could serve as an effective prevention strategy in high-risk patients. Vaccines may indirectly reduce the use of antibiotics and thus resistance development. Immunomodulation may increase the host's response to infections.

Vaccination strategies that provide long-lasting immunity are expected to exert lower selection pressure than therapeutic antibiotics. Vaccines are also less likely to induce resistance after they have become ineffective. Both monoclonal antibodies and immunomodulatory agents have shorter half-lives, so selective pressure remains a concern for these preventive measures.

9. Global Perspectives on Multidrug Resistance

The efforts of numerous countries and global organizations to combat multidrug resistance (MDR) have yielded significant outcomes, yet the threat of MDR continues. Consequently, the challenge of managing MDR remains substantial for researchers and practitioners worldwide. The ongoing emergence of various MDR strains at different times in different countries has prompted the implementation of diverse control and preventive strategies, ranging from strong adoption initiatives to hospital regulations requiring the screening of certain patient groups [8]. Some investigations have amassed considerable information regarding the epidemiology of MDR bacteria, uncovering discrepancies between strains isolated from patients, their environments, and both clinical and community settings. Due to these complications, the complexity of the MDR issue varies among countries, presenting a form of global challenge. Based on the current study and the accompanying literature, MDR—particularly hospital-acquired infections—persists as a significant concern worldwide. MDR prevalence is, therefore, considered one of the foremost global challenges over the next ten years. Strategies proposed to address MDR include international cooperation and financial and technical assistance to countries that struggle to disseminate information when MDR strains are first isolated and identified [6].

9.1. Comparative Analysis of Strategies Worldwide

The disproportionate burden of MDRO infections in hospital settings has led to their identification by the World Health Organization as priority pathogens to contain the threat and preserve antimicrobial efficacy.

9.2. International Collaboration Efforts

Control of MDR infections requires integration and coordination of actions across countries, healthcare facilities and communities. Systems for international collaboration and knowledge exchange must be integrated to generate real-time outputs and create a collaborative network. International organizations should take the lead in creating new networks to attract academia and stakeholders, and bring existing IPC and AMR networks under one umbrella. The WHO initiative SAVE LIVES: Clean Your Hands is an example of successful collaboration between global stakeholders. International and national surveillance of MDROs and antimicrobial consumption have existed for many years, but they have evolved into comprehensive surveillance systems only very recently, as part of national action plans on AMR. The importance of having efficient, integrated systems for surveillance should be stressed when addressing new regulations in countries that originally did not adopt such schemes. Surveillance systems must be complemented with efficient, accessible data repositories to allow real-time monitoring and analysis of AMR evolution. [30]

10. Challenges in Addressing Multidrug Resistance

The World Health Organization identifies antimicrobial resistance as a serious global threat with

rising morbidity, mortality, and health care costs [6]. Bacteria have developed widespread multidrug resistance via mobile genetic elements and accumulated mutations. Resistance mechanisms shape the epidemiology of infections and hinder patient management [9]. No single strategy suffices to limit antimicrobial resistance; a coordinated approach including strict control policies, continuous education, antimicrobial stewardship, and ongoing research is necessary. Health care systems face resource shortages that impede effective strategies. Surveillance networks often lack funds and information systems to provide timely, high-quality data. Clinical research also suffers from funding and regulatory delays, limiting progress on new antimicrobials and preventive interventions. Many developing countries lack a national policy against antimicrobial resistance. Regulatory restrictions on antimicrobial drug advertising and sales require constant updating to keep pace with the evolving resistance scenario.

10.1. Resource Limitations

Addressing the problem of multidrug resistance (MDR) remains a top priority worldwide. Many approaches have been developed and implemented by organisations and governments with strong economic and human outcomes. The major difficulty in implementing effective MDR control programmes remains the lack of sufficient and consistent resources [31]. The correlation between the MDR incidence and the low level of a government investment in health for the specific regions associated with failing control programmes is relatively well documented [32]. Governments are confronted with many other concerns in the health sector from diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria that are more prevalent than MDR infections, and tend to prioritise these areas for funding. While there is perhaps justification for this approach as MDR infections cannot be spread easily in the environment, controlling infections in a hospital environment could significantly reduce the potential opportunity to further spread.

10.2. Policy and Regulation Issues

Issues of drug policy and restriction considering the growing number of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) are indeed formidable challenges in infection control programs and antibiotic stewardship worldwide. Intense infection control precautions are applied in hospitals and institutions to prevent the acquisition of MDRO from patients colonized in the community, health care facilities, and other reservoirs. In intensive care units, the presence of multi-resistant microorganisms creates a risk of outbreaks, the consequences of which may be serious, even fatal. In most low-to-middle-income countries (LMICs), due to limited resources and settings, the implementation of control measures is very difficult, if not impossible; in such conditions, the measures imposed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may not be the most appropriate. Control programs are based on the correct use of antibiotics; the implementation of antimicrobial stewardship programs is recommended, together with the adherence to guidelines on hand hygiene, the use of gloves, the environmental cleaning and disinfection, the screening rectal cultures, the contact precautions (and/or isolation), the education and, perhaps less frequently, the monitoring of antibiotic consumption [14].

11. Future Directions in Research and Policy

Investigations into sources, spread, and control strategies for multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria continue to shape policy formulation. Quantitative data, molecular tools, and mathematical modeling advance risk assessment; track hospital ecology, imported carriage, and outbreak introduction; and support early-warning systems. Targeted interventions are designed through better understanding of the influence of commensal populations, patient-admission screening, infectiousness periods, antimicrobial exposure, and intensity of transmission in intensive care units. Environmental reservoirs are sampled with atomic-force and scanning-electron microscopy and deep-ultraviolet light—new techniques that detect MDR microcolonies on dry hospital surfaces. Proposals for policy makers include cross-organizational collaborations; prevention of releases due to inappropriate prescriptions; demand restriction; awareness campaigns; novel medicines; and promotion of occupant, staff, and visitor hygiene [33].

11.1. Emerging Technologies

Several distinctive classes of antimicrobial agents are now being introduced into clinical practice. These include carbapenems and monobactams, glycyclines, oxazolidinones and daptomycin. A number of “old” agents are being reconsidered for clinical use, including polymyxins, modified FQs and TEM-1-specific inhibitors. Even more unconventional therapies are being explored, including active and passive immunisation, bacteriophages and a variety of agents that disrupt the quorum-sensing capabilities of bacterial pathogens. Although extensive, this list is only a representative selection of promising new possibilities capable of combating the antibiotic-resistant pathogens that currently challenge both human and veterinary medicine. The development, production and clinical application of such agents will provide important means of control, but will always be very much a reactive component of a coordinated strategy for controlling resistance.

Syndromic antimicrobial therapy or diagnosis At present, the diagnosis of specific infectious diseases is generally achieved by either: (i) clinical evaluation and the exclusion of other diseases; or (ii) the detection of the causative agent. The difficulties with the culturing of many respiratory viruses such as Rhinovirus has led to the routine use of broadspectrum antimicrobial agents to treat such patients even when a viral aetiology is suspected. Control detection of the aetiological agent by more rapid means is required for effective treatment. Two strategies hold particular promise for improving such diagnoses. Rapid advances in molecular biology techniques and the formalisation of pharmacogenetics considerably shorten the time required to procure evidence of an aetiological association, and provide the basis for the differentially tailored antimicrobial therapies most appropriate for individual patients. A significant problem with a number of multiplex PCRs however is the inability to link the results with either a biological or a clinical/end-point. The unexpected discovery that individuals not Table III associated with cardiac, gastrointestinal and the oncology diseases cited had a 20% presence of HTLV-2 illustrates this problem.

Pyrosequencing Pyrosequencing relies on the fact that many enzyme-catalysed reactions produce released pyrophosphate (PPi). High-energy PPi is detected by transforming it to ATP, which drives the formation of light by luciferase. Intensity is proportional to the number of bases incorporated by an immobilised DNA polymerase upon sequential injection of the four nucleotides. As a result, extremely short columns suffice for DNA sequencing and the loss of signal with lengthening molecule is largely avoided. False-positives are avoided by combined ligase treatment. Direct detection of resistance markers is possible. Multiplex diagnosis of MDRs Such assays provide a fast, convenient method for ruling out the threatening MDRs pneumococcus, MRSA, VRE and ESBL-producing Gram-negative bacilli. Disadvantages are inherent in the broad-spectrum nature of the assay, from a clinical standpoint, and also in its current format, due to the lack of parallel testing and end-point selection. Another concern is the technical level for a diagnostic test that is used by reference laboratories. Although the latter could be improved by the use of chip-based technology, the issue regarding the range of antigen/protein- or nucleic acid markers included in the assay remains. A request for assistance from diagnostic industries to incorporate some of the RNA respiratory markers would undoubtedly enhance its acceptance and impact in the light of the problem with broadspectrum, personality-disordering therapy of pulmonary infections: (B) and (D).

11.2. Policy Recommendations

Policy recommendations to limit circulation of multidrug-resistant bacteria in hospital settings include strict infection control policies, education of healthcare professionals, and surveillance of antibiotic use. Education programmes contribute to increasing awareness, enhancing knowledge of antimicrobial resistance, and improving infection prevention and control compliance. Antibiotic stewardship procedures enable effective antibiotic use to counter selective pressure on resistance. Antibiotic cycling policies and reducing length of hospitalization are among control

strategies addressing resistance development and hospital stay duration. Monitoring of resistance is essential for assessment of implemented policies. A coordinated multidisciplinary approach is essential to reduce the spread of multidrug-resistant bacteria and the emergence of new multidrug-resistant bacteria in hospital environments [14].

12. Conclusion

The emergence of multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria poses a significant and serious challenge to healthcare systems and hospitals around the globe due to their remarkable resilience to multiple antimicrobial treatments. As these bacteria continue to evolve, they exemplify a pressing health crisis that requires immediate and effective response strategies within medical facilities. Infection prevention and control practices, along with robust hospital antibiotic stewardship, and vigilant active surveillance, are all essential components for effectively limiting the spread and impact of these dangerous bacteria. MDR bacteria are a natural occurrence in our environment and can often be carried by healthy individuals without any noticeable symptoms or incidents. However, they have the potential to be introduced into hospitals where they can persist on numerous surfaces, effectively serving as environmental reservoirs for infection. Cross-contamination that occurs between patients, particularly those utilizing various medical devices, can then facilitate the transmission of these bacteria, perpetuating a cycle of infection that can severely compromise patient health. Components of the healthcare environment, such as equipment and frequently touched surfaces, are especially prone to contamination due to the complex interplay between various reservoirs (which include patients, healthcare staff, and the broader environmental context) and the numerous passengers (such as hands, medical equipment, and air) that may inadvertently transport these organisms. An in-depth knowledge of how these bacteria disperse inter-hospital is crucial when designing effective strategies aimed at controlling their dissemination across healthcare facilities. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) has emerged as a powerful tool that greatly assists clinicians and researchers in determining the relatedness and transmission patterns of different bacterial strains, thereby allowing healthcare professionals to implement targeted interventions designed to pre-empt any further spread of these multidrug-resistant pathogens.

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